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ABSTRACT 
We consider the impact of the Brazilian crisis of 1999 on the extensive and intensive margin of exporters 
versus non-exporters through the open economy balance sheet channel. Using an open-economy balance-
sheet channel model with firm heterogeneity we explore predictors that firms will engage in global 
markets. Our results based on a detailed firm-level panel of data for Brazilian 10,573 firms for the period 
1996-2007, show that the decision to export and overall growth of sales for exporting firms is driven by 
size, the debt ratio, the current ratio and operating costs as well as the direct impact of the crisis itself. The 
findings suggest that the mechanism is driven by the response of the credit market to the creditworthiness 
of firms as it is by changing terms of trade. 
JEL: D21, D22, F14, F23 
1 
1. Introduction 
Historically, financial crises share many similarities (Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009), however, some 
involve a collapse of the exchange rate regime alone, others involve the banking system and still 
others combine both elements (twin-crises). Most studies evaluate the aggregate impact of crises by 
documenting the fiscal costs and lost output growth for the affected countries as a whole following 
various types of crises, but our paper is different.
1
 We consider how a crisis affects different types of 
firms within the crisis-affected country, and in particular its impact on exports at the extensive and 
intensive margins.
2
 By extensive margin we refer to the probability that more firms will export, 
while the intensive margin refers to the overall growth of total sales of exporting firms. This differs 
from the conventional measure of the intensive margin based on growth of export sales (which we 
cannot measure using our data), and requires caution in its interpretation – since growth could result 
from growing domestic sales as well as growth of exports – but expanding total sales is likely to be 
consistent with expanding export sales following a crisis.
3
 
Our focus is Brazil, where a well-defined currency crisis in 1999 reversed capital flows and 
depreciated the exchange rate in the aftermath of the East-Asian (1997) and Russian (1998) crises. 
Capital outflows in Brazil forced the government to float the real on January 1999, depreciating the 
exchange rate by 47 percent (see Goldfajn, 2000; Collyns and Kincaid, 2003; Goldstein, 2003). 
Although the central bank raised domestic interest rates to attract FDI inflows, which stabilized the 
exchange rate, there were consequences of the currency depreciation for exporters and non-
exporters. The private sector was partially hedged but externally-oriented firms were more exposed 
than domestically-oriented ones. We consider the impact of a drastic change in the exchange rate on 
the performance of exporters and non-exporters. We also consider how tighter financial conditions 
after the crisis may have influenced exporters depending on the quality of their balance sheets. Many 
firm-level studies have evaluated export performance after the global financial crisis (c.f. Berman et 
al. 2012; Behrens et al. 2013; Manova, 2013) but only the Manova et al. (2014) study of MNC 
foreign affiliates and joint ventures in China has a comparable focus on emerging economy firm-
level data. Using the SECEX database defining population of exporters in Brazil, we match balance 
sheets and income statements from Gazeta Mercantil and the Brazilian Institute of 
1 Eichengreen and Bordo (2003) document 258 crises, 1880-1997, and Allen and Gale (2004) discuss the financial costs of 
34 crises, 1977-2000. The average fiscal costs of resolution (percentage of GDP) was 4.5% for banking crises and 23% for 
twin crises. The mean cumulative output loss was 5.6% and 29.9% respectively. 
2 Blalock and Roy (2007) use a similar empirical methodology to analyse the behaviour of firms during the Asian crisis. 
They find that the losses in exports from the extensive margin were compensated by the gains from the intensive margin. 
Blalock et al. (2008) focus on the advantages of foreign ownership for capital investment. In a firm-level study of the 
2001 Argentine crisis Gopinath and Neiman (2011) find that the devaluation had a minor effect on the extensive margin 
of trade but a strong technological impact due to input readjustment. For the recent 2008 crisis see Chor and Manova 
(2012). 
3 The impact of the crisis is likely to be in the same direction, but more severe on the domestic market than on export 
markets because no competitive advantage results from the movement in the exchange rate in domestic sales, but import 
costs increase. 
2 
Geography and Statistics (IBGE). This allows us to examine the impact of the crisis on exporters and 
non-exporters due to changes in domestic demand, exchange rates and financial health. 
First, we explore the link between these mechanisms and the decision to export at the 
extensive margin controlling for depreciation in the real exchange rate and the financial health of the 
corresponding firm. There is a correspondence between our study and the recent literature on firm-
level export responses to variations in the real exchange rate (c.f. Berman et al. 2012 and Behrens et 
al. 2013). For example, Berman et al. (2012) consider the sensitivity of French firms’ exports to 
movements in the real exchange rate in the pre-financial crisis period, finding that there was 
considerable heterogeneity in the response of exporters to exchange rate changes. 
There is also similarity with Manova (2013) that explores the conditional probability of 
exporting using a Probit methodology similar to our own. Manova finds that financially advanced 
nations are more likely to export and the effect is stronger in sectors more dependent on external 
finance. The results also hold for product variety and numbers of trade partners. Hence credit 
availability and use have a strong influence over the decision to become an exporter. Credit 
availability often depends on financial health and collateral assets. We use the variation in the 
balance sheet characteristics of firms in the pre-crisis and crisis period for exporters and non-
exporters to explore the balance sheet channel in Brazil. Greenaway et al. (2007), do something 
similar by categorising firms into financially constrained or unconstrained using balance sheet 
variables.
4
 Exporting does not necessarily improve the balance sheets of firms, rather firms with 
stronger balance sheets, and less binding financial constraints, become exporters. We also confirm 
that firm financial characteristics such as size, short- and long-run debt ratios, liquidity, current ratio 
and the cost ratio influence access to finance and the ability of Brazilian firms to export. 
Second, we consider the impact on the intensive margin, by assessing the sensitivity of overall 
sales growth for exporters versus non-exporter at the time of the Brazilian financial crisis of 1999 
controlling for differences in the balance sheet characteristics of the two types of firms. We follow the 
logic of Manova (2013), who argues that access to finance is a key requirement for international trade. 
She finds strong support for an influence of financial development and external financial dependence 
on the intensity of exporting. Other studies of the importance of financial factors on margins of trade 
confirm these views using firm-level panels of data from developing countries (Berman and Héricourt, 
2010), and emerging economies (Bigsten et al., 2004, and Rankin et al., 2006). The novelty in our 
paper is that we consider the population of all exporters in Brazil before and after a financial crisis. 
Since our paper explores the impact of firm balance sheets on growth in sales there is much in 
common with dynamic models of export growth and financial constraints such as Besedeš et al. 
(2014). They find that exporters to the US and Europe face binding credit 
4 The standard definition of constrained and unconstrained firms is based on size, dividend, payouts and capital 
structure (cf. Fazzari et al., 1988, and the survey by Hubbard, 1998). 
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constraints after a crisis but these are relaxed after approximately three years as firms achieved 
growth in exports. Together with Muûls (2012) this paper shows that the impact of credit constraints 
on firms is dynamic rather than static, and varies between firms; we confirm this finding in our study 
of the intensive margin of exporting in Brazil. Empirically, we look at changes in sales growth for 
exporting and non-exporting firms, and find sales growth is highly responsive to the balance sheet 
characteristics of the firm and changes to growth vary with the export- or non-export status of the 
firm around the time of the crisis. 
Comparisons of the relative importance of extensive and intensive margins show the intensive 
margin is dominant. Behrens et al. (2013) study of Belgian data for exporters in 2008-2009 to 
consider why trade collapsed during the financial crisis finds the vast majority of the decline in 
exports was at the intensive margin. There was no reduction in the number of exporting firms due, 
they argue, to the sunk costs of entering foreign markets.
5
 As the adjustment took place mainly on the 
intensive margin there was a healthy rebound in exporting when demand picked up. Demand in the 
destination market was a key determinant of changes to export volumes in their data during the crisis, 
explaining over half of the fall in exports. Manova (2013) drew a similar conclusion from cross-
country data: between 30-40% of a reduction in exports from financial development was due to 
changes at the extensive margin, while 60-70% was due to reductions at the intensive margin. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present an open economy 
extension of Holmström and Tirole (1997). This simple model allows us to examine separately the 
effects of currency depreciation on each of the two margins of international trade and thus provide a 
useful framework for our empirical work. Section 3 derives the market equilibrium and Section 4 
examines firm-level adjustment to a currency crisis. Section 5 outlines our methodology and data 
before we discuss our results in Section 6, where we consider the exchange rate and the balance 
sheet channels through which as our model suggests the crisis may affect the extensive and intensive 
margins of exports. Section 7 concludes. 
2. The model 
We consider a two-sector open-economy model that combines the fixed- and variable-investment 
versions of Holmström and Tirole (1997). The imposition of fixed outlays will separate firms 
according to their exporting status and thus, in conjunction with financial constraints, will deliver an 
extensive margin. The variable investment feature will account for the intensive margin. 
5 There is a large international trade literature that makes a positive link between entry to export markets and firm size 
through sunk costs; see Bernard et al. (2003), Helpman et al. (2004), Melitz (2003) and Manova (2013). Manova et al. 
(2014) document that there are additional fixed costs of exporting due to investment in capacity, product customisation, 
regulatory compliance, and setting up foreign distribution networks. Empirical support for this view is offered in Aw and 
Hwang (1995), Roberts and Tybout (1997), Aw et al. (2000), Tybout (2003), Bernard and Jensen (2004), Girma et al. 
(2004) and Greenaway et al. (2007). 
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There are two countries: a small open economy (domestic economy) and the rest of the world. 
Let e denote the exchange rate (domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency). In period 0 the 
government pegs the exchange rate at e = 1 and agents expect that the peg will be maintained. There 
is no prior knowledge of a crisis. 
There is a continuum of risk-neutral entrepreneurs of unit measure. Each entrepreneur is 
endowed with one unit of labour and some amount of assets, A. The only heterogeneity among 
entrepreneurs is their endowment of assets, which is distributed on the interval [0, A]. F denotes the 
distribution function and f the corresponding density function. 
The economy has two final goods sectors; the output of the first sector is only consumed 
domestically, while the output of the second sector can either be consumed at home or exported. We 
label the former ‘domestic’, and the latter ‘exportable’, keeping in mind that the actual decision to 
export is made by the entrepreneur. The inputs used in this economy are sector-specific. The 
domestic good (numeraire) is produced under a CRS technology whereby production of one unit 
requires one unit of labour. 
The technology for producing the exportable good exhibits increasing returns. It needs to be 
managed by an entrepreneur who invests physical assets.
6
 The size of start-up capital required 
depends on whether or not the firm exports. Let K𝐷 denote the size of the assets that must be invested 
by a firm producing only for the domestic market and K𝑋(> K𝐷) denote the level of investment 
required by a firm that also exports part of its output. Assets are also used for the purchase of inputs 
from domestic or foreign sources, which are employed in fixed proportions. Let p denote the fraction 
of the input from a domestic source. To keep the analysis simple we assume that these inputs are 
inelastically supplied. One unit of the domestic input costs one unit of assets while the unit cost of 
the foreign input is equal to one unit of foreign currency. As long as the peg is maintained the 
domestic currency unit cost of the composite input c is equal to 1. 
Following Holmström and Tirole (1997), we assume that the variable investment technology is 
linear. However, the factor of proportionality is different between exporters and non-exporters. One 
reasonable interpretation is that the new higher fixed cost, in addition to covering costs related to the 
establishment of new markets also captures a reorganization of production encouraged by economies 
of scale related to the simultaneous production of goods for the domestic and foreign markets. To 
keep the analysis of the demand-side of the model simple we ignore preferences and focus on 
revenues. While this implies that introducing demand uncertainty is straightforward and allows us to 
focus on the financial side of the model, it comes at the cost of ignoring currency 
6 Having to allocate time to manage the firm an entrepreneur does not have any available labour for producing the 
domestic good. 
5 
effects on relative prices.
7
 We assume that revenues of the exportable good are stochastic. Thus, 
with probability 𝑝 E {𝑝𝐿, 𝑝h} an investment in the composite input of 𝐼 units yields revenues 𝑉𝐷 𝐼 
when the firm produces only for the domestic market and revenues 𝑉𝑋𝐼 (𝑉𝑋 > 𝑉𝐷) when the firm 
also exports. With probability 1 − 𝑝 the investment fails and yields nothing. These shocks are 
identical and independently distributed across firms. 
The probability of success depends on the entrepreneur’s effort. Exerting effort 
raises the probability of success to 𝑝𝐻 while shirking lowers the probability of success to 
𝑝𝐿(< 𝑝𝐻), however, in the latter case there is an additional benefit, 𝐵𝐼, which is 
proportional to the investment level. Let ∆𝑝 E 𝑝𝐻 − 𝑝𝐿. We assume that when the 
entrepreneur exerts effort the per unit of investment operating profit is positive, i.e. 𝑝𝐻𝑉  
> 𝑐, and negative otherwise, i.e. 𝑝𝐿𝑉  + 𝐵  < 𝑐, where 𝑉  E {𝑉𝐷, 𝑉𝑋}. We impose the 
following restriction on the parameters of the model that ensures that the investment 
level is finite:
8
 
𝑝𝐻 (𝑉 − 𝐵𝑝 ) < 1; 𝑤h𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑉 E {𝑉𝐷,𝑉𝑋} (1) 
∆ 
All agents must decide which good to produce. Those agents producing the domestic good 
lend their assets to other entrepreneurs that produce the exportable good, while those agents who 
produce the exportable good use their assets plus borrowed resources to cover their fixed and 
variable costs. The second group of agents must also choose between producing only for the home 
market and producing also for export. 
There is a credit market that channels funds from those domestic goods producers 
to exporters. This market determines the equilibrium gross interest rate, 𝑟. Assuming 
limited liability of the borrower the financial contract will specify that the two parties 
receive nothing when the project fails. Let 𝑅𝑙 denote the payment to the lender when the 
project succeeds which implies that the entrepreneur keeps 𝑅𝑏 E 𝑉𝐼 − 𝑅𝑙. Consider an 
entrepreneur with wealth, 𝐴, and total investment, 𝑐𝐼  + 𝐾. Noting that 𝑉  E {𝑉𝐷, 𝑉𝑋} and 
𝐾  E {𝐾𝐷, 𝐾𝑋}, the lender's zero-profit condition is given by 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑙 = (𝑐𝐼  + 𝐾  − 𝐴)𝑟  or 
𝑝𝐻(𝑉𝐼 − 𝑅𝑏) = (𝑐𝐼 + 𝐾 − 𝐴)𝑟 (2) 
This assumes that the contract induces the entrepreneur to exert effort which is ensured by the 
satisfaction of the incentive compatibility constraint 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑏 ≥ 𝑝𝐿𝑅𝑏 + 𝐵𝐼. The benefit of not shirking 
is the increase in the expected payoff from 𝑝𝐻𝑅𝑏 to 𝑝𝐿𝑅𝑏 while the cost is the loss of the private 
benefit. We can write the constraints as: 
𝑅𝑏 ≥ ∆𝐵𝐼𝑝 (3) 
By substituting (3) into (2) we get an upper bound for the level of investment. 
7 See Berman et al. (2012). Nevertheless, in our empirical work we control for such effects. 
8 As in Holmström and Tirole (1997), when this inequality is not satisfied moral hazard does not have any 
impact on the ability of firm to raise external funds. 
6 
𝐼∗ ≤ (𝐴−𝐾)𝑟 (4) 
𝑐 𝑟 − 𝑝𝐻 ( 𝑉 −  ∆  𝐵  𝑝 )   
Inequality (1) implies that the denominator of (4) is positive. The above inequality suggests that the 
entrepreneur must have sufficient assets to cover the initial fixed investment, 𝐾. Beyond that level 
borrowing can reach a maximum 𝑑 ≡ 𝑘 − 1 times the level of remaining assets, where 𝑘 ≡ 
𝑟  
𝑐𝑟−𝑝𝐻 (𝑉− ∆𝐵  𝑝). Any amount above this level violates incentive compatibility in which 
case the 
entrepreneur will not exert effort. Given that lenders make zero profits the entrepreneur's payoff 
increases in the level of investment, and in equilibrium both (3) and (4) are satisfied as equalities. 
Thus an entrepreneur with an endowment of assets, 𝐴, can borrow an amount 𝑐𝐼∗ + 𝐾 − 𝐴. 3. Market 
equilibrium 
To derive the financial market equilibrium we need to allocate agents to their sector of employment 
and for those agents who manage firms in the exportable sector we also need a separation between 
those that produce only for the domestic market and those that also export. We show that those 
agents with low endowments of assets will produce the domestic good, and those agents with 
medium level endowments will produce the exportable good but will only be able to sell it in the 
domestic market while those agents with high endowments will produce the exportable good and sell 
it both domestically and abroad. 
3.1. Earnings and sector of choice 
The earnings of an agent with an endowment of physical assets, 𝐴, who becomes an entrepreneur is 
equal to 𝑝𝐻 𝐼. This follows from the fact that in equilibrium the incentive compatibility 
constraint 𝐵 
∆𝑝  
is binding. The earnings of the same agent who chooses the non-exportable goods sector is 
equal to 1 + 𝐴𝑟, which comprises the income from labour plus the return from lending to 
producers of exportable goods. Setting the above two expressions to be equal (using (4) to 
substitute for 𝐼) and solving for 𝐴  we find a threshold level of initial holdings of physical assets 𝐴∗ 
such that all agents with 𝐴  > 𝐴  ∗ produce the exportable good and all other agents produce the 
non- 
exportable good. The solution for 𝐴∗ is given by 
𝐴∗ = ( 𝑝𝐻 𝐵 ∆ 𝑝 (5) 
𝑝 𝐻 𝑉 𝐷 − 𝑐 𝑟 )  ( 1  𝑟  +  𝐾 𝐷 )  −  𝑟  1  
Condition (1) implies that the expression in the first bracket is bigger than 1. This implies that 
the threshold is decreasing in the revenues of the exportable good. It is also increasing in agency 
costs as measured by 𝐵𝑝 . This is true because as these costs move up the number of agents that 
can ∆ 
gain access to external funds decreases. The remaining influence in the first bracket is the 
7 
 mark-up, 
which indicates the degree to which firms can raise prices above marginal costs due to market power 
or efficiency of operations. Lastly, the threshold also increases with the market interest rate as a 
higher rate encourages saving. 
 
̃ A, that separates those that export from those that do not by equating their respective investment 
levels (by substituting their respective fixed cost and revenue parameters in (4)) and solving for A. 
The solution is: 
B 
(  K  x  −  K  D  )  (  c  r  +  P  H  A  p  )  +  P  H  (  K  D  V  x  −  K  x  V  D  )  (  6  )  P  I I (  V  x −  V  D  )  
̃ 
Agents with wealth equal to A are indifferent between producing only for the domestic 
market and also producing exports. In the former case they borrow less given that (a) KD < Ks, and 
(b) the 
investment levels are the same in the two cases, however, in the latter case revenues are higher so 
that profits in the two cases are the same. 
4. Firm level adjustment to a currency crisis 
Suppose that the government is forced to abandon the exchange rate peg so the exchange rate 
becomes e = 1 + x where x > 0 captures the rate of depreciation. We now consider the immediate 
and the long-run effects associated with the currency depreciation on contracts signed after the 
crisis. 
4.1. Immediate effects of the crisis 
Depreciating the currency has an immediate impact on those firms that had signed loan contracts 
immediately beforehand. 
9
 These firms must now purchase foreign inputs at a higher price in 
domestic currency units. Thus, the total amount of funds used to purchase the composite input is the 
same, but the number of units purchased equals j* , where C = 1 + (1 − (p)𝑥. Thus, expected 
C 
revenues decline. All firms that produce goods for the domestic market experience a decline in 
profits. Given that the obligations of firms to their creditors are unaltered, those firms closer to the 
threshold, A*, might be unable to repay their loans, and might go bankrupt. In contrast, the effect of 
the depreciation on exporters is ambiguous because, even though they sell less output - which 
declines because fewer costly inputs can be purchased with a given income - they do so at a higher 
price in the foreign market. This could result in a higher or a lower profit for the exporter. 
A ̃  = 
9For those firms that managed to hedge their positions in the foreign exchange market the impact would have been less 
severe. 
3.2. The choice to export 
Given that the income of an entrepreneur is equal to pH Al3PI we derive the threshold level of assets, 
8 
4.2. Long-run effects of the currency depreciation 
Currency depreciation has two direct effects on firms and one indirect effect. It directly affects (a) 
production costs, since the costs of imported materials rises, and (b) the revenues of exporters, since 
the value of foreign sales increases after the depreciation. It indirectly affects balance sheets through 
access to financial markets and rising interest rates, which affects how much manufacturing firms 
can borrow. 
For those firms that produce only for the domestic market the increase in per unit cost implies 
that investment declines (see (4)). Exporters alone reap the benefits of currency depreciation. Their 
revenues will now be above Vx but less than (1 + x)Vx. The overall effect on their investment 
depends on the relative effects of depreciation on their costs and revenues. 
In order to assess the effect of currency depreciation on access to financial markets we need to 
consider the two threshold levels of assets that separate (a) those producing exportable goods into 
those that service both the domestic and the foreign market from those that service only the 
domestic market, and (b) those that produce exportable goods from those that produce domestic 
goods. The direct effect of currency depreciation increases the level of the first threshold, A*, since 
... 
an increase in costs discourages entrepreneurs, while the effect on the second threshold, A , is 
ambiguous, since exporters face an increase in both costs and revenues. There is also an indirect 
effect through the impact of currency depreciation on the equilibrium interest rate. 
4.3. Predictions 
Our model makes the following predictions that we will test in the following sections: 
1. Both cut-off values, A* and A , rise with an increase in agency costs, therefore the mass of 
... 
exporting firms decline as agency costs increase. 
2. The cut-off value for initial holdings of physical assets sufficient to produce the exportable 
good, A*, is increasing with a currency depreciation (cost effect) and the inverse of the markup 
(costs, competition and efficiency). Thus, the mass of firms that never export increases. 
3. Currency depreciation has an ambiguous effect on the cut-off value for initial holdings of 
... 
physical assets sufficient to export the good, A , since exporting firms are less adversely affected by 
the currency depreciation and might even benefit. 
4. Sales growth for non-exporting firms is negatively affected by currency depreciation, and 
the effect is stronger for firms with poorer balance sheets. For exporting firms the effect is 
ambiguous as the relative price of exports declines. 
First there are predictions about the decision to export at the extensive margin. Our model 
follows the international trade literature in predicting that larger firms that are also financially 
9 
healthy are more likely to export, and any depreciation of the exchange rate will further encourage 
exporting. 
Movements in the exchange rate can affect both the cost of imported intermediate goods and 
the value of exports affecting the profitability of firms that sell goods abroad. We expect that the 
effects of exchange rate fluctuations to depend on whether or not a firm exports. For example, the 
depreciation of the currency might still boost the incentive to reach foreign markets. We can illustrate 
this point with reference to data on the movements of the effective exchange rate against the ratio of 
exporters to total number of industrial firms for the period of our sample in Figure 1. 
Second there are predictions relating to the growth in overall sales of firms that export; these 
sales will increase for larger financially healthy firms that export, and be less affected by a 
depreciation of the exchange rate. By comparing the performance of exporting firms to the 
performance of non-exporters we expect exporters to have greater sales. The evidence in Figure 2 
shows the ratio of exports to GDP. In the years following the crisis Brazilian firms experienced a 
rising export ratio and this continued until 2004, by which time the ratio had more than doubled 
compared to the period before 1999. 
The next section explains the methodologies we use to explore the empirical evidence. 
5. Methodology and Data 
5.1. Empirical methodology 
Our definition of an ‘exporter’ is based on positive sales outside the domestic market at the firm 
level, the most disaggregated information we can obtain from our data source. A change occurs at the 
extensive margin if a firm becomes an exporter, registering positive export sales in total sales for the 
year, and at the intensive margin if the value of foreign sales increases from one year to the next for a 
firm that is already exporting.
10
 We do not have information on individual products or export 
destinations for Brazil from our data source, which we discuss below. 
To explore the extensive margin we use Probit estimates of the probability that a firm i, in 
country j, will export at time t. Our theoretical model indicates that the probability that a firm exports 
will depend on the scale of the firm, its financial health and the effective exchange rate. As our 
dependent variable takes values of zero or one, we will initially use a static pooled Probit estimator is 
clustered on firm ID number to ensure that the estimation of the matrix of variance and covariance 
allows for intra-firm correlation. The model is: 
Prob(y = 11x) = ix: 13 0(t)dt = c13(x11) = 
c13(130 + lAinTOTAL ASSETSiit + 132LONG RUN LOANS RATIOut + 
10 For other definitions used in the literature see Besedeš and Prusa (2011, p 372). 
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133SHORT RUN LOANS RATIOiit + 134COST RATIOut + 135CURRENT ASSETS RATIOut + 
136CURRENT RATIOut + 137CHANGE IN REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATEit + 
138GDP GROWTHit+139COMMODITY PRICE GROWTHit + erroriit) (7) 
where Φ represents the cumulative standard normal distribution function. Equation (7) can take into 
account unobserved heterogeneity in this static framework with the addition of random effects. 
However, the random effects Probit model requires that firm-specific unobserved effects are 
uncorrelated with the regressors, which might not hold. The standard alternative in the literature is 
the fixed effects model. However, since the within transformation for probit does not exist, we 
estimate equation (7) assuming a linear probability model using fixed effects. Finally, we will 
estimate a dynamic pooled Probit and dynamic fixed effects model with the addition of a lagged 
dependent variable to control for the fact that many firms never export, which can create curvature 
of the regression function close to the values of 0 or 1. 
On the right-hand side, in addition to the effective exchange rate, we have also included the 
following variables as balance sheet proxies for agency costs. TOTAL ASSETS, defined as total 
book value of assets (in logarithms) as a proxy for firm size. The LONG-RUN and SHORT-RUN 
DEBT RATIOS are measures of the ratio of long-run (short-run) debt to total assets, which we use as 
proxies for agency costs.
11
 The COST RATIO is equal to operational costs divided by revenue used 
as a proxy for the inverse mark-up ratio. We also use the CURRENT ASSET RATIO, which equals 
the ratio of current assets to total assets, and the CURRENT RATIO, the current assets over current 
liabilities to measure access to liquid assets and liabilities. 
The model predicts that larger firms will be exporters, since they have sufficient assets to 
produce and export the good, so we expect a positive sign on the coefficient associated with TOTAL 
ASSETS. Debt can enable exporting or it can be an adverse signal of agency costs that weighs on a 
firm’s ability to produce exportable goods, or it can limit the firm’s ability to raise external funds, 
therefore we cannot determine a priori the sign of the coefficient associated with our debt ratios. 
However, a higher value of the COST RATIO is likely to reduce the probability of exporting, and the 
CURRENT ASSET RATIO tells us that firms have a higher proportion of liquid assets in total assets, 
making it more likely that they will export. A higher CURRENT RATIO shows that firms have higher 
assets relative to liabilities Firms with higher current ratios are likely to be less financially 
constrained, and more likely to be exporters, therefore we expect a positive sign on this variable.
12
 
The inclusion of the current asset ratio is in accordance with the free cash-flow theory 
11 Agency costs are associated with debt because when managers accumulate more debt they introduce a potential 
conflict of interest between owners, managers and lenders; see Myers (1977) and Mello and Parsons (1992). 
12 Some authors have also added a measure for productivity following Melitz (2003), which underlines its importance of 
on the extensive and intensive margins, but the evidence in Greenaway et al (2007) specifically with reference to the 
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according to which agency costs are positively related to excess liquidity and thus negatively related 
to investment and sales. 
We also allow for an exchange rate depreciation to influence the probability of export. We use 
the real effective exchange rate calculated according to the following formula: 
*r 
er = ∑ 𝑤𝑖E𝑖 (8) 
𝑖  𝑃  
where P is the domestic price index, P* is the price index of the rest of the world, and Ei is the 
nominal exchange rate of trade partner i (expressed in reals per unit of foreign currency) and wi is 
based on the amount of trade with country i. In addition we include macroeconomic variables to 
allow for variation in demand, relative prices and costs, as well as the crisis dummy=1 in 1999 and 
zero otherwise, and year effects. 
In order to assess if the impact of the crisis was different between exporters and non-exporters 
we have estimated the following sales growth regression model: 
DL SALESiit 
= 130 
+ 131 DLSALESiit_1 + 132 In TOTAL ASSETSiit + 133 CURRENT ASSETS RATIOut 
+ 134CURRENT RATIOiit + 135COST RATIOiit + 136LONG RUN LOANS RATIOut 
+ 137SHORT RUN LOANS RATIOut+138CHANGE IN REAL EFFECTIVE EXCHANGE RATEi t 
+ 139GDP GROWTHit+1310COMMODITY PRICE GROWTHit + erroriit 
(9) 
The dependent variable is the change in logarithm (sales). While we cannot separate domestic sales 
from exports, we know total sales for exporters and non-exporters. According to our model, total 
sales for exporters should be more sensitive to agency costs, scale and the exchange rate. We 
exercise caution when interpreting growth in total sales as the intensive margin, since growth in sales 
refers to export and domestic sales. However, in a crisis domestic sales growth is likely to fall as 
firms gain no competitive advantage from terms of trade but their import costs increase. 
Equation (9) can be estimated by either difference GMM or system GMM following the 
econometric approach of Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and 
Bond (1998) used by Bond et al. (2003), Bond et al. (2011), Akarım (2013) and Mulkay and 
Mairesse (2013). The Arellano–Bond estimator differences the variables before using GMM, while 
the Arellano–Bover and Blundell–Bond estimator improves efficiency by requiring the first 
differences of instrument variables are uncorrelated with the fixed effects. The addition of further 
exporting decision finds “no significant effect” of total factor productivity or labour productivity on the probability of 
exporting. Greenaway and Kneller (2004) also found at best weak evidence of higher productivity among exporters 
compared to non-exporters using an unmatched sample of firms, which “disappears” when a matched sample is used. 
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equations in levels creates additional moment restrictions improving efficiency, lowering the finite 
sample bias versus the first difference GMM, and for this reason we prefer to use system GMM. 
The validity of the system GMM estimates depends on suitability of the instruments, which we 
test using a Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions and a second-order serial correlation test 
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991). The first test is asymptotically distributed as a chi-square 
with degrees of freedom corresponding to the number of instruments minus the number of 
parameters for the null of instrument validity. The second test is asymptotically Normal under the 
null of no second-order serial correlation. We include dummy variables for industry, year and state, 
which are exogenous in the “IV-style” (Roodman, 2009), while firm-specific variables that are 
considered endogenous are incorporated as instruments in the “GMM-style” (Roodman, 2009). The 
IV approach has been chosen to ensure that we use instruments for variables potentially correlated 
with the error term. We require at least three consecutive firm-year observations for all firms. 
To discriminate between the system- and first-difference GMM estimators we use the 
difference-in-Hansen statistic (Roodman, 2009), to test the validity of the additional instruments 
under system GMM. This compares the Hansen test using a full or a sub-set of instruments, and the 
test statistic is asymptotically chi squared, with degrees of freedom equal to the difference in the 
number of instruments. If the test is not rejected, system GMM is superior since it conditions for 
additional (valid) instruments in estimation. 
5.2. Data 
Our data sample 1996-2006 is from three different sources. Data from SECEX covers the full 
population of exporting firms, ensuring that our data on exporting is representative and complete.
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This includes the population of exporters, allowing each firm in each year to be classified as a non-
exporter or an exporter all other firms identified by CNPJ (Brazilian firm identification number) are 
non-exporters. We can obtain firm balance sheets and income statements from Gazeta Mercantil 
using the CNPJ identifier for each firm.
14
 Other Brazilian data, such as national and industry-level 
data are provided by IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics).
15
 
We downloaded 52,244 balance sheets from Gazeta Mercantil. After cleaning, the total 
number of firms that provided total assets, current assets, permanent assets, long-run assets, current 
liabilities, long-run liabilities, and equity comprises 25,945 balance sheets, but a further 3,190 
observations were dropped because of erroneous recordings (e.g. inconsistent balances where total 
assets are different from total liabilities) or extreme outliers (we removed the top and bottom one 
percentile of the distribution for each variable). Of the remaining 22,755 observations, only 10,573 
13 For more information, see 
http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br/sitio/interna/interna.php?area=5&menu=1444&refr=603 (last accessed 22/05/15). 
14 For more information, see http://www.investnews.com.br/ (last accessed 22/05/15). 
15 See http://www.ibge.gov.br/home/ (last accessed 22/05/15). 
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have no missing values for any of the variables used in our estimations. More observations were 
lost when lags were used in the estimations, therefore the number of observations in the Tables 
differ. 
Table 1 provides summary statistics for the firm-level variables. Half of the firms in our 
sample are exporters. There is considerable variation in the data as can be seen by the considerably 
large standard errors. There are some very large firms with high asset values, and some small firms. 
The median firm has US$18.5mn in total assets of which US$8mn are current assets. The ratios of 
short-term and long-term debt to total assets are around 7% and 6% of total assets for the median 
firm, but there are some firms with substantially higher debt ratios. 
The second part of Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for continuing exporters, starters 
(new exporters), and stoppers (firms that ceased to export). A test of the equality of the means for all 
three categories (first column, lower panel), shows that most variables are statistically equal, but the 
change in the log of sales and the current asset ratio differ significantly between groups. Noticeably, 
growth of sales is positive for starters and continuing exporters but negative for stoppers, and it is 
significantly different based on F-tests of equality. The liquidity measure (current asset ratio) is 
lower for stoppers than for the other two groups and once again, there is a significant difference 
between firms. The differences are less marked between starters and continuing exporters as an F-
test does not reject the null (at 95% significance) of equality in any category except sales growth in 
the second column. 
The third part of Table 1 provides the descriptive statistics for small and large firms, for 
exporters and non-exporters, and for small versus large exporters and small versus large non-
exporters. Small firms and large firms are defined relative to the median value of the asset 
distribution of firms in our sample for each year and industry.
16
 Exporters are more prevalent 
among larger firms, they have lower cost ratios, and are more liquid. Differences are evident 
between small exporters and small non-exporters as well as between large exporters and large non-
exporters. 
6. Results 
6.1. Evidence on the Extensive Margin 
Table 2 presents the results of the Probit estimations reporting the estimated coefficients and the 
marginal effects of the variables on the probability of export. We report results for a static pooled 
Probit model, a random effects Probit model, a linear probability model with fixed effects, a 
dynamic pooled Probit and a dynamic fixed effects model as discussed in section 5.1. To control for 
possible endogeneity we report results using the first lag of all variables. Before we discuss the 
16 The findings are not significantly affected when we use alternative cut-off values at the 33
rd
 and 66
th
 percentile. . 
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firm-specific effects in detail, we mention the impact of variables that influence all firms: the 
change in the real effective exchange rate raises the probability of exporting a little (similar to 
Berman et al., 2012), while the crisis itself decreases it. Demand effects measured by GDP growth 
in the rest of the world increase the probability of being an exporter (as they do in Behrens et al., 
2013), and higher commodity prices reduce it by a small amount. These are consistent with our 
initial assumptions. 
We now turn to the coefficients associated with asset size, short-term and long-term loan 
ratios, and liquidity measures; we find they have signs predicted by the model and are strongly 
significant. In Table 2, an increase in asset size results in a higher probability of export. Although 
small, the relationship between the lenders’ export decisions and their asset size is entirely consistent 
with the theory and other evidence on access to export markets reported in Roberts and Tybout 
(1997), Berman and Héricourt (2010), Bernard et al. (2003), Tybout (2003), Bernard and Jensen 
(2004), Girma et al. (2004), Helpman et al. (2004), Rankin et al. (2006) and Greenaway et al. (2007. 
propose that size may be a proxy for some time-invariant firm characteristic that drives exporting 
e.g. access to skilled labour, but it could equally be a proxy for ‘access to finance’ given the critical 
role of information inefficiencies, Beck et al. (2009). The domestic focus of small firms’ activities 
compared to the international export focus of larger firms makes size important to lenders in open 
economy credit channel models. There are fewer incentives for financial intermediaries to lend to 
small firms but greater incentives to lend to large firms since they are more diversified financially 
and when they have access to global markets they have exposure to markets at different phases of 
the business cycle, stabilising cash flow and credit provision (Campa and Shaver, 2002). 
There is a small positive effect from higher short-term debt ratios, which is weakly significant, 
but long-term debt ratios have no effect on exporting. To the extent that debt matters, firms that can 
obtain external finance have higher debt capacity and lower external financial constraints (Fazzari et 
al., 2000; Berman and Héricourt, 2010), and are more likely to export. There is other evidence from 
developing and developed countries that tighter financial constraints are imposed on non-exporters 
versus exporters (see Campa and Shaver, 2002; Harrison and McMillan, 2003; Berman and 
Héricourt, 2010; Muûls 2012). In our case the influence of debt ratios is weak as far as the extensive 
margin is concerned. 
Our paper produces other interesting findings. Liquidity is an important determinant of the 
extent of export sales. A 1% increase in the current asset ratio increases the probability of exporting 
by 0.37 (column 1) in the log-linear pooled Probit model, which demonstrates liquidity has a large 
positive impact on the probability of exporting. It may indicate that liquid assets can be pledged as 
collateral (Fazzari and Petersen, 1993); or that a high level of liquid assets mitigates agency costs. It 
might have a similar interpretation to the cash-flow measure used by Bond et al. (2003), Berman 
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and Héricourt (2010) and Forlani (2011).
17
 The coefficient associated with the current ratio has a 
small negative effect on exporting (-0.013) in the pooled Probit model.
18
 
Surprisingly, the cost ratio, which reflects the power to raise price above marginal cost, has no 
significant impact on the probability of exporting. While costs might be expected to vary with the 
degree of competition that firms face and may raise the threshold for exporting, they have little 
impact on the extensive margin. 
When we make allowance for unobserved heterogeneity, using random effects in a Probit 
model or fixed effects in a linear probability model (columns 2 and 3), we find similar results to 
those discussed above. The random effects Probit coefficients in column 2 are an order of 
magnitude larger than those reported in column 1, but still show positive and significant influence 
of size and liquidity on the probability of exporting. The results for the marginal effects of the 
fixed effects linear probability model in column 3 are smaller than column 1 but of the same order 
of magnitude. 
The dynamic models (columns 4 and 5) report coefficients very similar in magnitude to the 
static pooled Probit and fixed effects linear probability models – size and liquidity measures have a 
positive marginal effect on the probability of exporting. The major difference in these models is the 
introduction of a control for firms that are already exporting using a dummy for exporter status in the 
previous period. The coefficient associated with this dummy is positive and significant, showing 
strong persistence in the exporter decision (see also Muûls, 2012). Clearly, firms that become 
exporters tend to remain exporters, suggesting there are few reversions once exporting has begun 
possibly due to the importance of sunk costs; our results indicate that some balance-sheet variables 
such as size and liquidity continue to significantly increase the probability of a non-exporter 
becoming an exporter. 
6.2. Evidence on the Intensive Margin 
Table 3 presents the total sales growth regression results related to our investigation of the intensive 
margin estimated using system-GMM. According to our model we would expect to see some 
differences between exporters and non-exporters, especially during a period of exchange rate 
fluctuations, therefore, we first estimate coefficients for the full sample (column 1), we then consider 
sub-samples of data for exporters and non-exporters separately (columns 2 and 3) and for exporters 
and non-exporters separately interacted with the post-crisis dummy (columns 4 and 5). 
17 Note that current assets over total assets is a ratio that reflects stocks not flows. Cash flow is a flow measure of the 
resources available to the firm. They are not directly comparable despite similar interpretations on the coefficients we 
obtain from different regressions. 
18 The two variables are not correlated (corr coeff = 0.014). The first illustrates the value of liquid assets in total assets 
while the second indicates the extent to which firms face limited access to external finance. 
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Finally, we use the full sample with interactions for exporter and post-crisis dummy and Export 
Status*Crisis interaction (columns 6 and 7). 
Firm size (log of total assets) has a positive and significant influence on the intensive margin 
for exporters and non-exporters, though the magnitude is smaller for exporters. In a later comparison 
of small versus large firms in Table 4, we find that larger firms are less sensitive to size than small 
firms, which is in accordance with Caballero and Hammour (1994) who note smaller firms grow 
faster. Larger firms are more likely to be exporters due to the requirement for external finance and 
the ability to absorb exchange rate fluctuations in their markups (see Berman et al., 2012, Besedeš et 
al. 2014). 
The current asset ratio (current assets in total assets) has a strongly positive and significant 
effect on sales growth regressions in all columns of Table 3 just as it did in Table 2. In general, 
using sub-sample information we find non-exporters are more sensitive to this indicator than 
exporters as revealed by a comparison of columns 2 and 3 (without crisis interactions) and 
columns 4 and 5 (with crisis interactions). Sales growth responds nearly one-for-one with the 
current asset ratio for non-exporters, while for exporters an increase in this ratio raises growth by 
between 60-70 percent. Bond et al. (2003) argue that there is bi-directional causality between cash 
flow, investment and sales growth, with lags of each variable being able to predict the current 
values of the other variables. This suggests that cash flow measures and real activity measures 
such as sales growth are interrelated at the firm level, although the intensity varies across 
countries. As we argued earlier, liquid assets may relax financial constraints for firms that have 
growth options, and more so for firms that have limited availability of external finance. We 
confirm the positive and significant effect of current asset ratio on sales growth found by Bond et 
al. (2003). Our other measure of liquidity is the ratio of current assets to current liabilities (the 
current ratio). This is almost uncorrelated with the current asset ratio, and given that we have 
controlled for liquidity already, it has a small but significantly negative effect on sales growth. 
These findings are consistent with the prediction of our model that lower agency costs will 
increase sales growth as firms expand exports. 
In contrast to our results for the extensive margin reported in Table 2, we find the cost ratio 
influences the intensive margin. The cost ratio reflects both the competitive environment facing the 
firm and its operational efficiency which tends to influence the intensity of exports, lifting sales 
growth. Behrens et al. (2013) note that most adjustment occurs at the intensive margin in response to 
significant shocks, due to the presence of fixed costs of export participation, and the above result 
confirms this. Lower costs improve competitiveness and increase sales directed to exports compared 
to the home market. 
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The remaining balance sheet variables in Table 3 show some significance. Higher short-term 
debt depresses sales, while higher long-term debt ratios have a significant positive influence on sales 
growth. If a firm tests the waters by carrying more short-term debt it would explain the negative 
effect of short-term debt. A higher long-term debt ratio is consistent with greater exporting in our 
model. The coefficient associated with the current ratio is negative for the same reasons discussed in 
Table 2. 
Finally, we allow for the crisis=1 in 1999 and zero otherwise, exporter status and interactions 
between our variables and these two dummies (column 7). Therefore we can separate the crisis 
effect, other year effects and macroeconomic influences arising from changes in demand, 
competitiveness and prices or costs. The crisis has a significant negative effect on export intensity 
as expected. For exporter status, our model predicts that competitiveness gains would be greater 
after the crisis compared to non-exporting firms and this is what we find in columns 2-5. The 
constant in the regression is large, negative and significant for non-exporters and smaller, negative 
and insignificant for exporters (columns 2 and 3, and 4 and 5). Finally, interacting the exporter 
status with the crisis we find positive effects of greater size, long-term loans, and higher liquidity 
are intensified in the crisis (the sum of coefficients is larger), and only costs are moderated by the 
crisis. Being an exporter has a similar effect except the advantages of greater size and liquidity 
diminish but cost influences increase. 
In Table 4 we allow for firm size and for interaction of size with the crisis. Evidence in 
Berman et al. (2012) shows small exporters behave differently to large exporters. This could explain 
why we found differences between sensitivity of exporters and non-exporters to balance sheet 
variables in Table 3, but we did not explicitly test differences due to firm size. In Table 4 we report 
results from sub-samples of our data comprising small and large firms (columns 1 and 2) separated 
at the median of the distribution of real assets for all firms in our sample.
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 We then allow for 
interactions between small and large firms and the crisis dummy (columns 3 and 4). Finally, to avoid 
the possibility that our results could be affected by firms that transit from small to large within our 
sample period, we re-estimate the model using interactions for small and large firms and the crisis 
dummy in the full sample (column 5), which also ensures we do not drop any firms with too few 
observations because they were observed as large or small for short durations. 
The sales growth of small firms is lower than the sales growth of larger firms other things 
equal evidenced by a larger negative and significant constant for small firms. We find that small 
firms have larger estimated coefficients associated with total assets (size); liquidity (current asset 
ratio) has a positive influence on sales growth for small and large firms, but again the magnitude of 
19 Separation using the 33rd and 66th percentiles leaves our results unchanged. 
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the coefficient is larger for small firms compared to large firms. As with the extensive margin, we 
find that these are the major determinants of exporting at the intensive margin. 
The cost ratio which reflects the extent to which the firms can raise price above marginal cost 
has a smaller negative sign for small firms. Small firms have less market power than large firms, 
when their costs fall they benefit less than large firms from a reduction in their operating costs. 
Similarly, large firms benefit more from higher long-term loans ratios than small firms. 
Results in columns 3-5, allowing interactions with the crisis dummy indicates that advantages 
due to size are magnified in a crisis, and the effects are larger for large firms. The crisis reduces the 
influence of other variables. When we consider the effect of being large in column 5, large firms 
benefit more from higher long-term debt ratios, and less from greater short-term debt ratios and 
liquidity; however, being large, any further increase in size makes little difference to the export 
intensity. A large firm in the crisis gains most from raising the short-term loans ratio. Larger firms 
may have tested the market when their products were competitive, funding the expansion of sales 
with short-term debt. A test of significance for the interaction terms with dummies for large and 
crisis in column 5 is rejected (p-value = 0.0187) which indicates that there was a significant 
influence of the crisis on the sales growth at the intensive margin. We conclude that large firms 
have significantly different sales growth responses to the variables in our model compared to small 
firms. However, when we test the jointly zero restriction on the Large*Crisis interaction with the 
variables in our model we do not reject the null that the crisis experience is significantly different to 
non-crisis periods for large firms (p-value = 0.6255). 
Diagnostic statistics for Tables 3 and 4 do not reject the null hypotheses of no second-order 
serial correlation (m2) and valid instruments. The difference-in-Hansen statistics overwhelmingly 
support our choice of the system-GMM estimator over the alternative. 
7. Conclusions 
Our paper complements much of the literature on performance of exporters and non-exporters using 
firm-level panels (c.f.; Campa and Shaver, 2002; Harrison and McMillan, 2003; Berman and 
Héricourt 2010; Berman et al. 2012; Behrens et al. 2013; Manova et al. 2014), adding to our 
understanding of the effects of financial health on the extensive and intensive margin of exporters 
versus non-exporters by looking at the impact of the Brazilian crisis of 1999. Using a unified 
theoretical framework based on a two-sector extension of Holmström and Tirole (1997) model, we 
explore predictors that firms will engage in global markets and export more intensively. Our results 
based on a detailed firm-level panel of data for the entire population of exporting Brazilian firms from 
1996-2006, show that the decision to export at the extensive margin is driven by size, liquidity, and 
the competitive effects of the crisis, supporting other evidence from developing countries 
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reported Berman and Héricourt (2010) and Manova et al. (2014). When we examine the intensive 
margin through growth of sales, we find higher exposure to short-term loans reduces sales growth, 
reflecting the exposure firms face to rollover risk, but this can be offset to a degree by higher 
liquidity and total assets. There is also a clear competitiveness channel since our results show 
exporters fare less badly than non-exporters after the crisis and see a greater improvement after 
2003. The findings confirm the mechanisms described in our model using available exporter status 
information from SECEX, but it would be informative to extend the empirical specification of the 
model using more disaggregated data where the destination of exports and product level data were 
available. 
The main policy implication of our results is that larger firms and firms with greater 
liquidity are more insulated from shocks related to an exchange rate crisis. Financial health 
supports exports and sales growth, since severe economic shocks are less disruptive for these firms. 
The focus of policymakers seeking to ensure steady growth should be on the promotion of financial 
development, which is likely to enable firms to hold liquid assets and gain access to external 
finance, in order to be able to ride out shocks. 
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Table A1: List of sectors 
 
Appendix 
Sector Freq. Percent Cum. 
Agriculture 946 8.95 8.95 
Appliances 173 1.64 10.58 
Beverages and Tobacco 349 3.3 13.88 
Chemical and Petrochemical 636 6.02 19.9 
Cleaning and Hygiene 120 1.13 21.03 
Construction 555 5.25 26.28 
Electric Equipment 179 1.69 27.98 
Electronics Materials 150 1.42 29.4 
Food 1,102 10.42 39.82 
Leather and Shoes 257 2.43 42.25 
Livestock 420 3.97 46.22 
Mechanics 287 2.71 48.94 
Metallurgy 938 8.87 57.81 
Mining 208 1.97 59.77 
Motor Vehicles and Parts 624 5.9 65.68 
Non-Metallic Mineral 430 4.07 69.74 
Office Supplies 34 0.32 70.07 
Petroleum and Gas 144 1.36 71.43 
Pharmaceutics 173 1.64 73.06 
Plastic and Rubber 544 5.15 78.21 
Pulp and Paper 330 3.12 81.33 
Sugarcane / Sugar / Alcohol 573 5.42 86.75 
Textile 959 9.07 95.82 
Various Fabrications 39 0.37 96.19 
Wood and Furniture 403 3.81 100 
Total 10,573 100  
Note: Only observations that present no missing values for any of the 
following variables included: Export Status, Total Assets, Short-Run Loans 
Ratio, Long-Run Loans Ratio, Cost Ratio, Current Assets Ratio, Current 
Ratio, and Effective Exchange Rate. More observations may be lost when 
lags are used in the estimations. 
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 Figure 1: The Incentive to Export and the Effective Exchange Rate 
Sources: Real Effective Exchange Rate: IPEA (Research Institute of Applied Economics, www.ipeadata.gov.br). 
Number of Exporters: SECEX (Brazilian Secretary of International Trade, http://www.desenvolvimento.gov.br). 
Number of firms: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Economy and Geography, www.ibge.gov.br). 
2 5  
 
961 981 
f xesatoprE iR 
l)xgfvae(Growt inch
E R 
20 
ear 
02 204 
206 
 Figure 2: The Aggregate Export to GDP Ratio 
Source: World Bank. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics Part 1 
    
Variable N Median SD Min Max 
Growth of Sales 7587 0.03 0.55 -7.01 8.34 
Export Status 10573 0 0.5 0 1 
Total Assets* 10573 18.5 52.1 0.298 1150 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 10573 0.07 0.2 0 10.56 
Long-Run Loans Ratio 10573 0.06 0.18 0 3.02 
Cost Ratio 10573 0.77 146.93 0 14869.17 
Current Assets Ratio 10573 0.42 0.21 0 0.98 
Current Ratio 10573 1.4 2.75 0.01 100.55 
Real Effective Exchange 
Rate (Growth Rate, %) 10573 -2.36 16.19 -15.13 47.8 
Note: Only observations that present no missing values for any of the following variables included: Export Status, Total 
Assets, Short-Run Loans Ratio, Long-Run Loans Ratio, Cost Ratio, Current Assets Ratio, Current Ratio, and Effective 
Exchange Rate. More observations may be lost when lags are used in the estimations. * Units in millions of current 
dollars. 
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Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics Part 2 
    
Variable N Median SD Min Max 
Continuing exporters      
Growth of Sales 2060 0.02 0.39 -2.09 7.18 
Total Assets* 2060 23.6 49.9 0.741 555 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 2060 0.09 0.22 0.00 8.44 
Long-Run Loans Ratio 2060 0.07 0.14 0 2.76 
Cost Ratio 2060 0.75 11.35 0.22 484.38 
Current Assets Ratio 2060 0.46 0.18 0.03 0.92 
Current Ratio 2060 1.4 1.48 0.05 40.37 
Starters      
Growth of Sales 159 0.07 0.53 -0.87 3.64 
Total Assets* 159 21.8 37.4 1.62 199 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 159 0.09 0.19 0 1.92 
Long-Run Debt Ratio 159 0.06 0.22 0 2.4 
Cost Ratio 159 0.79 4.25 0.23 52.38 
Current Assets Ratio 159 0.45 0.18 0.05 0.86 
Current Ratio 159 1.42 2.11 0.11 20.28 
Stoppers      
Growth of Sales 151 -0.05 0.52 -1.13 3.6 
Total Assets* 151 22.4 49.0 1.89 343 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 151 0.08 0.18 0 1.81 
Long-Run Debt Ratio 151 0.08 0.22 0 1.8 
Cost Ratio 151 0.78 2.72 0.44 30.19 
Current Assets Ratio 151 0.42 0.19 0.03 0.9 
Current Ratio 151 1.34 1.65 0.09 14.37 
Note: Only observations that present no missing values for any of the following variables included: Export Status, Total 
Assets, Short-Run Loans Ratio, Long-Run Loans Ratio, Cost Ratio, Current Assets Ratio, Current Ratio, and Effective 
Exchange Rate. More observations may be lost when lags are used in the estimations. * Units in millions of current 
dollars. 
F tests for equality of means across groups – pvalue 
 
All three 
categories 
Starters 
and Cont. 
Exps 
Growth of Sales 0.0041 0.0031 
Total Assets 0.2167 0.0889 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 0.9815 0.8489 
Long-Run Debt Ratio 0.1061 0.3203 
Cost Ratio 0.9934 0.9697 
Current Assets Ratio 0.0209 0.5517 
Current Ratio 0.3593 0.1670 
2 8  
Table 1- Descriptive Statistics Part 3 
      
 Small Firms  Large Firms  Exporters  Non-Exporters 
Variable N Median N Median N Median N Median 
Growth of Sales 2887 0.01  4700 0.04  3877 0.04  3710 0.03 
Export Status 4221 0  6352 1  5269 1  5304 0 
Total Assets* 4221 6.39  6352 33.4  5269 22.4  5304 15.1 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 4221 0.06  6352 0.08  5269 0.09  5304 0.05 
Long-Run Debt Ratio 4221 0.06  6352 0.07  5269 0.06  5304 0.07 
Cost Ratio 4221 0.76  6352 0.78  5269 0.76  5304 0.79 
Current Assets Ratio 4221 0.44  6352 0.4  5269 0.46  5304 0.37 
Current Ratio 4221 1.44  6352 1.38  5269 1.38  5304 1.42 
   Small Non-    Large Non- 
 Small Exporters  exporters  Large Exporters  exporters 
Variable N Median N Median N Median N Median 
Growth of Sales 1242 0.03  1645 0  2635 0.04  2065 0.05 
Export Status 1770 1  2451 0  3499 1  2853 0 
Total Assets* 1770 7.46  2451 5.48  3499 35.7  2853 30.7 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 1770 0.07  2451 0.05  3499 0.09  2853 0.06 
Long-Run Debt Ratio 1770 0.06  2451 0.06  3499 0.07  2853 0.07 
Cost Ratio 1770 0.74  2451 0.78  3499 0.77  2853 0.79 
Current Assets Ratio 1770 0.49  2451 0.39  3499 0.45  2853 0.35 
Current Ratio 1770 1.43  2451 1.44  3499 1.36  2853 1.4  
Note: Firms are classified as large or small based on the median of total assets by industry and year. Only observations that present no missing 
values for any of the following variables included: Export Status, Total Assets, Short-Run Loans Ratio, Long-Run Loans Ratio, Cost Ratio, 
Current Assets Ratio, Current Ratio, and Effective Exchange Rate. More observations may be lost when lags are used in the estimations. * 
Units in millions of current dollars. 
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Table 2 Probit Model of Exporting at the Extensive Margin 
 
(1) 
Pooled 
Probit 
(2) 
Random- 
effects 
Probit 
(3) 
Fixed- 
effects 
(4) 
Dynamic 
Pooled 
Probit 
(5) 
Dynamic 
fixed- 
effects 
Change in Real Effective Exchange 
Rate 0.001 0.015* 0.002 0.006*** 0.002* 
 (0.331) (0.069) (0.101) (0.006) (0.052) 
Dummy: Crisis -0.027 -0.635 -0.075 -0.212** -0.086* 
 (0.721) (0.127) (0.151) (0.048) (0.087) 
Dummy: Year 2000 0.011 0.048 0.004 0.045 0.007 
 (0.623) (0.658) (0.764) (0.152) (0.590) 
Dummy: Year 2001 0.053 0.175 0.033 -0.012 0.018 
 (0.176) (0.382) (0.205) (0.825) (0.460) 
Dummy: Year 2002 0.063*** 0.320*** 0.045*** -0.012 0.027** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.658) (0.035) 
Dummy: Year 2003 0.120*** 0.707*** 0.104*** 0.093*** 0.082*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.010) (0.000) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.024*** 0.137*** 0.019*** 0.022** 0.015*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.039) (0.001) 
Commodity Prices Growth Rate -0.002 -0.014* -0.002** 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.119) (0.073) (0.036) (0.869) (0.123) 
Total Assets (t-1) 0.099*** 0.717*** 0.111*** 0.043*** 0.085*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Short-Run Loans Ratio (t-1) 0.121* 0.129 -0.008 0.055 -0.022 
 (0.075) (0.611) (0.857) (0.264) (0.608) 
Long-Run Loans Ratio (t-1) -0.037 0.009 -0.006 0.018 0.006 
 (0.641) (0.972) (0.872) (0.755) (0.861) 
Cost Ratio (t-1) -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.149) (0.786) (0.636) (0.339) (0.578) 
Current Assets Ratio (t-1) 0.372*** 1.753*** 0.169*** 0.228*** 0.129*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
Current Ratio (t-1) -0.013** -0.058*** -0.001 -0.007* -0.001 
 (0.016) (0.009) (0.613) (0.074) (0.575) 
Dummy for Exporter (t-1)    0.766*** 0.251*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant   -1.473***  -1.130*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000) 
Number of observations 7,690 7,736 7,736 7,690 7,736 
R2 (see table notes) 0.207  -0.355 0.568 -0.268 
Intra-class correlation (rho)  .859 .735  .644 
  (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) 
Note: p-values in parentheses. All columns present probit results except for column 3, where the linear probability 
model is assumed. In Columns 1 and 4, pseudo R
2
 reported; robust variance estimation method is used (clustered by 
firm). In Columns 3 and 5, overall R
2
 reported; the strong significance of the estimated intra-class correlations 
(Columns 2, 3 and 5) indicate strong association among observations of the same firm across years. In Columns 1, 2 
and 4, Marginal effects (calculated at the average) reported. Coefficient estimates, not reported for the sake of space, 
present the same qualitative results and are available upon request. Dummies for industry effects and state effects are 
included in Columns 1, 2 and 4. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates significance at the 5% level. *** 
indicates significance at the 1% level. (t-1) indicates the first lag of the respective variable. 
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Table 3: System GMM 
 
(1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Exporters 
(3) 
Non- 
Exporters 
(4) 
Exporters 
and crisis 
(5) 
Non- 
exporters, 
and crisis 
(6) 
Exporters 
and crisis 
(7) 
Exporters, 
crisis and 
exporters* 
crisis 
Growth of Sales-1 -0.112*** -0.064*** -0.149*** -0.023*** -0.112*** -0.079*** -0.074*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Assets (TA) 0.161*** 0.050*** 0.197*** 0.031*** 0.150*** 0.098*** 0.095*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* TA    0.063*** 0.080*** 0.021*** 0.008* 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.099) 
Exporter* TA      -0.046*** -0.032*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* Crisis*TA       0.004*** 
       (0.009) 
Short-Run Loans 0.022 0.014** -0.119*** 0.020*** -0.341*** -0.080*** -0.112*** 
Ratio (SLR)        
 (0.127) (0.033) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis*SLR    0.192*** -0.099 0.205*** 0.382*** 
    (0.000) (0.306) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* SLR      0.046*** 0.100*** 
      (0.001) (0.000) 
Exporter* Crisis*SLR       -0.274*** 
       (0.007) 
Long-Run Loans Ratio 0.137*** 0.077*** 0.128*** 0.097*** 0.079*** -0.014* -0.018*** 
(LLR)        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.082) (0.009) 
Crisis* LLR    0.237*** -0.209*** -0.242*** -0.316*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* LLR      0.122*** 0.125*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* Crisis* LLR       0.484*** 
       (0.000) 
Cost Ratio (C) -0.004*** -0.010*** -0.004*** -0.019*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis*C    0.048*** 0.033*** 0.029*** 0.030*** 
    (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter*C      -0.016*** -0.016*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* Crisis*C       -0.001* 
       (0.100) 
Current Assets Ratio 1.131*** 0.712*** 1.126*** 0.200*** 0.605*** 0.461*** 0.394*** 
(CA)        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* CA    -0.166*** -0.015 -0.072*** -0.008 
    (0.001) (0.503) (0.000) (0.724) 
Exporter * CA      -0.244*** -0.068*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* Crisis*CA       -0.134*** 
       (0.001) 
Current Ratio (CR) -0.014*** -0.001*** -0.020*** 0.004*** -0.014*** -0.007*** -0.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* CR    0.019*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
    (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Exporter *CR      0.004*** 0.010*** 
      (0.000) (0.000) 
Exporter* Crisis*CR       0.020*** 
       (0.000) 
31 
Table 3: System GMM (Continued) 
 
(1) 
Full 
Sample 
(2) 
Exporters 
(3) 
Non- 
Exporters 
(4) 
Exporters 
and crisis 
(5) 
Non- 
exporters 
and crisis 
(6) 
Exporters 
and crisis 
(7) 
Exporters 
crisis and 
exporters 
* crisis 
Dummy: Export 
Status 
-0.007*** 
    
0.863*** 0.505*** 
 (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Crisis -0.027 -0.128*** 0.131*** -1.202*** -1.093*** -0.276*** -0.138* 
 (0.104) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.074) 
Dummy: Year 2000 -0.037*** -0.064*** -0.037*** -0.056*** -0.053*** -0.058*** -0.053*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2001 0.075*** -0.009** 0.159*** -0.013* 0.174*** 0.083*** 0.083*** 
 (0.000) (0.047) (0.000) (0.057) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2002 -0.210*** -0.288*** -0.181*** -0.292*** -0.196*** -0.249*** -0.245*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2003 0.385*** 0.397*** 0.350*** 0.408*** 0.368*** 0.385*** 0.388*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in Real        
Effective Exchange -0.003*** -0.001*** -0.007*** -0.001*** -0.009*** -0.005*** -0.005*** 
Rate        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.052*** 0.061*** 0.040*** 0.058*** 0.039*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Commodity Prices -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
Growth Rate        
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.197*** -0.812*** -3.889*** -0.667*** -3.067*** -2.080*** -1.966*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of 
observations 
5,549 2,896 2,653 2,896 2,653 5,549 5,549 
Hansen Statistics (p- 
value) 
0.005 0.224 0.327 0.155 0.213 0.187 0.219 
Difference-in-Hansen 
test 
(p-value) 
m1 (p-value) 
0.336 
0.000 
0.121 
0.000 
0.447 
0.000 
0.041 
0.000 
0.364 
0.000 
0.060 
0.000 
0.141 
0.000 
m1 (p-value) 0.776 0.014 0.518 0.016 0.840 0.832 0.756 
Number of 
Instruments 
561 492 497 504 509 957 969 
 
Note: p-values in parentheses. All estimates use two-step, system GMM, with fixed effects for industries and states. 
Exporter is a dummy equal to 1 if firm i exports in year t. Crisis is a dummy equal to 1 if year is larger or equal to 1999. 
The Hansen statistic for valid overidentifying restrictions is distributed 
2
 under the null of instrument validity. m1 (m2) is 
a test for first- (second-) order serial correlation in the first-differenced residuals, asymptotically distributed as N(0,1) 
under the null of no serial correlation. Difference-in-Hansen Statistics test the validity of System GMM under the null of 
valid System GMM instruments. Dummies for industry, year and state are exogenous and are included in the “IV-style” 
(Roodman, 2009) form. Endogenous variables are instrumented in the “GMM-style” (Roodman, 2009) using lags ≥ 2 in 
the transformed equation and lags ≥ 1 in the level equation. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** indicates 
significance at the 5% level. *** indicates significance at the 1% level. 
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Table 4: GMM Regressions of the Intensive Margin (Small v. Large Firms) 
 
(1) 
Small 
Firms 
(2) 
Large Firms 
(3) 
Small firms, 
and crisis 
(4) 
Large firms 
and crisis 
(5) 
All firms, 
crisis and 
size 
Growth of Sales-1 -0.114*** -0.117*** -0.070*** -0.100*** -0.068*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Assets (TA) 0.205*** 0.072*** 0.214*** 0.077*** 0.073*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* TA   0.086*** 0.136*** -0.064*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Large* TA     -0.001*** 
     (0.000) 
Large*Crisis*TA     0.008*** 
     (0.000) 
Short-Run Loans Ratio 0.014*** -0.135*** -0.002 -0.229*** 0.016*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.487) (0.000) (0.003) 
Crisis*SLR   0.002 0.143** -0.001 
   (0.985) (0.036) (0.957) 
Large* SLR     -0.302*** 
     (0.000) 
Large*Crisis*SLR     0.703*** 
     (0.000) 
Long-Run Loans Ratio 0.139*** 0.268*** 0.090*** 0.181*** -0.033*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* LLR   -0.194*** 0.031 -0.257*** 
   (0.000) (0.625) (0.000) 
Large* LLR     0.252*** 
     (0.000) 
Large*Crisis* LLR     -0.128** 
     (0.032) 
Cost Ratio (C) -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.004*** -0.017*** -0.004*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis*C   0.035*** -0.016*** 0.037*** 
   (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Large*C     -0.013*** 
     (0.000) 
Large*Crisis*C     -0.059*** 
     (0.000) 
Current Assets Ratio (CA) 1.238*** 0.980*** 0.624*** 0.374*** 0.473*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* CA   0.025 -0.154*** -0.093* 
   (0.574) (0.000) (0.056) 
Large*CA     -0.174*** 
     (0.000) 
Large*Crisis*CA     -0.078 
     (0.152) 
Current Ratio (CR) -0.015*** -0.012*** -0.013*** -0.015*** -0.010*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Crisis* CR   -0.002** 0.010*** -0.002** 
   (0.039) (0.000) (0.047) 
Large*CR     0.012*** 
     (0.000) 
Large*Crisis*CR     -0.010*** 
     (0.000) 
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Table 4: GMM Regressions of the Intensive Margin (Small v. Large Firms) (Continued) 
 
( 1 )  
S m a l l  
F i r m s  
(2) 
Large Firms 
(3) 
Small firms, 
and crisis 
(4) 
Large firms 
and crisis 
(5) 
All firms, 
crisis and size 
 
 
Dummy: Export Status 0.036*** -0.032*** 0.088*** -0.053*** 0.020*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Crisis 0.281*** -0.262*** -1.027*** -2.488*** 1.061*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2000 -0.054*** -0.055*** -0.043*** -0.065*** -0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2001 0.186*** -0.050*** 0.200*** -0.006 0.076*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.390) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2002 -0.241*** -0.280*** -0.229*** -0.252*** -0.250*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dummy: Year 2003 0.355*** 0.324*** 0.385*** 0.362*** 0.388*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Change in Real Effective Exchange 
Rate -0.011*** 0.001*** -0.012*** -0.001*** -0.005*** 
 (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.004) (0.000) 
GDP Growth Rate 0.042*** 0.045*** 0.042*** 0.050*** 0.050*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Commodity Prices Growth Rate -0.007*** -0.004*** -0.006*** -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Constant -3.849*** -1.681*** -3.916*** -1.655*** -1.694*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of observations 2,155 3,394 2,155 3,394 5,549 
Hansen Statistics (p-value) 0.852 0.128 0.722 0.010 0.100 
Difference-in-Hansen Statistics 
(p- value) 
m1 (p-value) 
0.764 
0.000 
0.342 
0.000 
0.450 
0.001 
0.014 
0.000 
0.017 
0.000 
m1 (p-value) 0.806 0.370 0.560 0.397 0.746 
Number of Instruments 547 558 559 570 969  
Note: See note to Table 3. In Column 4, firms are classified as large or small based on the median of total assets by 
industry and year. In Columns 1 to 3, firms are classified as large or small based on the median of total assets by industry, 
but not by year, to avoid firms being used in both regressions if they change sizes across the years. 
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